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CURRENT TRENDS IN FACULTY PERSONNEL POLICIES: 
APPOINTMENT, EVALUATION AND TERMINATION 
ANNETTE B. JOHNSON* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As many a university president has learned to his or her dismay, the 
medical school, which is usually a school of the university, differs in many 
ways from the other university schools and colleges.  In contrast to the 
traditional school of arts and sciences, the costs of providing a medical 
education program are staggering.1  To be successful, the medical school must 
employ researchers and clinical practitioners as well as teaching faculty. 
Consequently, much of the faculty’s professional time is devoted to 
research and patient care, rather than to traditional teaching.2  Full-time clinical 
faculty are required to contribute receipts from their patient care services to the 
school.  In turn, this patient care revenue subsidizes the costs of medical 
education and research.3  In addition, fulfillment of the medical school’s 
 
* Annette Johnson, Ph.D., J.D., is the Vice Dean and Senior Counsel for Medical School Affairs 
at the New York University School of Medicine.  The author gratefully acknowledges Katie 
Wise, a student at New York University School of Law, who assisted in the research and 
proofreading of this article during an internship at the Office of Legal Counsel, New York 
University. 
 1. See ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, THE FINANCING OF MEDICAL 
SCHOOLS: A REPORT OF THE AAMC TASK FORCE ON MEDICAL SCHOOL FINANCING (1996) 
[hereinafter AAMC, MEDICAL SCHOOL FINANCING].  This report by the Association of American 
Medical Colleges (“AAMC”) provides a thorough introduction for understanding the factors 
impacting United States medical schools, including the financial structure of medical schools, 
sources of revenue, medical education and research costs, and reliance on patient care (“clinical”) 
revenues to supplement research and medical educational expenses. 
 2. See id. at 16 (noting that “[a] full time clinical faculty member . . . may derive 100 
percent of compensation from faculty practice plan revenues, yet devote 1.5 days per week to 
teaching and research”). 
 3. See id. at 15-16.  The legal structures of such “Faculty Practice Plans” vary.  In general, 
Faculty Practice Plans share the following common elements: the clinical faculty member is an 
employee of the medical school or of a separately incorporated not-for-profit entity related to and 
controlled by the medical school; and all patient care revenues are deposited into the Faculty 
Practice Plan account and are used to pay the expenses of conducting the private practice, 
including salaries of the clinical faculty members, a “dean’s tax,” and in some cases, a 
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educational mission requires a complex set of relationships with hospitals and 
other health care providers and compliance with complex payment regulations 
that carry criminal as well as federal and state civil sanctions.4 
Until relatively recently, medical schools and health care providers 
enjoyed a golden age of unprecedented growth and surplus funds.  Revenues 
from faculty members practicing medicine in Faculty Practice Plans, and 
Medicare revenues to teaching hospitals, subsidized the medical school.5  
During this period, universities and medical schools expanded, without 
significant attention to expansion’s consequences.  The faculty appointment 
process, academic titles, and tenure policy for the medical school were in 
accordance with the universities’ general policies.6 
These policies typically followed the academic rules and standards 
articulated by the American Association of University Professors (“AAUP”) in 
the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (“1940 
Statement of Principles”) which solidly linked tenure and titles.7  For example, 
a school following the 1940 Statement of Principles usually appointed all full-
time faculty above the level of instructor as assistant, associate, or full-
professor, with unmodified titles; as such, the faculty members were appointed 
to the tenure track.8  A modified title, such as “clinical associate professor,” 
indicated a non-tenure track and part-time appointment.  This title was viewed 
as unfitting for a medical school faculty member who spent full-time in the 
service of the medical school, even if such service was largely spent in the 
practice of medicine, generating revenues to support him or herself and the 
 
Chairman’s tax.  Id.  The dean’s tax provides unrestricted supplementary income for support of 
the teaching and research mission of the medical school.  Id. at 16. 
 4. For a discussion of these laws and regulations, see Pamela H. Bucy, The PATH From 
Regulator to Hunter: The Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in the Investigation of Physicians 
at Teaching Hospitals, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 3 (2000). 
 5. See AAMC, MEDICAL SCHOOL  FINANCING, supra note 1, at 15.  The AAMC’s 1994 
survey indicated that eighty percent of academic funding was derived from faculty practice plan 
revenue. 
 6. For a thorough review of the history and legal significance of tenure in universities and 
medical schools see Lawrence White, Academic Tenure: Its Historical and Legal Meanings in the 
United States and Its Relationship to the Compensation of Medical School Faculty Members, 44 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 51 (2000). 
 7. See 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, reprinted in 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3 
(1995) [hereinafter AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS].  The 1940 Statement of Principles 
on Academic Freedom and Tenure is also available online at (visited Jan. 3, 2000) 
<http://www.igc.apc.org/aaup/1940stat.htm>. 
 8. The 1940 Statement of Principles indicates that an individual with “the rank of full-time 
instructor or a higher rank” is subject to a probationary period; however, the individual “should 
have permanent or continuous tenure” after the probationary period expires.  Id. at 4. 
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medical school’s education and research activities.9  As a consequence of 
tenure’s “up-or-out” rule, and a desire to promote and retain valuable clinical 
faculty members, many medical schools awarded tenure to full-time clinicians. 
With the advent of managed care and society’s unwillingness to continue 
to pay ever-higher costs for medical care, clinical revenues of many medical 
schools declined, eventually causing concern about the ability of medical 
schools to continue to be self-sufficient, and resulting in a reexamination of 
medical schools’ policies and obligations.10  The 1993 elimination of the 
mandatory retirement age exemption for universities accelerated this process.11  
Medical schools, and their parent universities, discovered that many schools 
had failed to define the “economic security” that would be associated with 
tenure.  Would the school or the university be responsible for the entire salary 
of a clinical faculty member, whose salary was derived largely from patient 
services revenues, if the faculty member ceased to be active as a clinical 
practitioner?  In the case of a faculty member whose salary had been largely 
supported by grants from the federal government or industry, would the school 
or university be obligated for the researcher’s entire salary, even if the funding 
sources dried up?  Were there any systems in place to guarantee accountability, 
for example, performance expectations, linked with compensation? 
As a consequence of these inquiries, a number of significant changes have 
occurred in medical school personnel policies in the past decade, all tending to 
create greater accountability and to introduce into the academic medical center 
environment the practices and realities of the business management world.12  
The changes in medical school policies have not been adopted across the 
universities, however, because faculties in other schools of universities 
continue to view themselves as different from medical school faculties, and 
thus exempt from such forces. 
 
 9. See Robert F. Jones & Jennifer S. Gold, AAMC Paper-Faculty Appointment and Tenure 
Policies in Medical Schools: A 1997 Status Report, 73 ACAD. MED. 211, 216 (1998) (noting that 
these tracks were sometimes “viewed as having ‘second class’ status”). 
 10. Id. at 212. 
 11. See Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 
6(b), 100 Stat. 3342, 3344 (1986).  On December 31, 1993, this section repealed subsection (a) 
which temporarily added subsection (d) to 29 U.S.C. § 631.  The repealed subsection (d) 
provided: “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit compulsory retirement of any 
employee who has attained 70 years of age, and who is serving under a contract of unlimited 
tenure . . . at an institution of higher education.” 
 12. See Jones & Gold, supra note 9, at 212.  The article reports the results of a 1997 AAMC 
survey to which all 125 United States allopathic medical schools responded.  This survey is the 
most recent and comprehensive analysis of current policies and practices in medical school 
appointment and tenure, and together with articles referenced therein, provides the numerical 
basis for the discussion that appears in Part II of this article. 
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II. CURRENT TRENDS IN MEDICAL FACULTY PERSONNEL POLICIES 
A. Academic Title and Tenure 
It is difficult for the informed individual outside of academe to 
comprehend the importance of the academic title to a faculty member and the 
rigidity of the connection between academic title and tenure.  In the university 
setting, the prestige titles such as assistant, associate, and full professor are 
“unmodified,” because they have been nationally recognized as meaning that 
the individual is either tenured or on a tenure track, and as such, is committed 
on a full-time basis to the institution.  In many universities, promotion from 
assistant professor to associate professor, or retention of an associate professor, 
is linked to tenure.13 
In medical schools, this linkage, coupled with tenure’s “up-or-out” rule, 
meant that medical schools recognizing valuable clinical assistants or associate 
professors for promotion or retention were forced to grant tenure to these 
individuals.  Otherwise, under the rules of tenure in effect at almost all 
universities, these clinical assistants or associate professors could not be 
reappointed to a full-time position after the end of the tenure probationary 
period.14  The resulting  “Catch-22” was that clinical faculty were not likely to 
meet the common university tenure requirements of original scholarship and 
published research in peer-reviewed publications.15  In the past ten years, three 
trends have emerged in this area: 
 Modification of the link between title and tenure; 
 Modification of the link between promotion and tenure; and 
 Introduction of new full-time faculty tracks.16 
Many medical schools’ rules currently permit indefinite appointment of a 
faculty member on a non-tenure track on a full-time basis.17  In addition, or 
concurrently, these medical schools have introduced separate and distinct 
 
 13. Id. at 215. 
 14. See, e.g., 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, reprinted in 
AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 7, at 4 (stating that a probationary faculty 
member must be given notice of a school’s negative tenure decision at least one year prior to 
expiration of the probationary period).  See also 1970 Interpretive Comments, reprinted in AAUP 
POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 7, at 7 (stating that if “the [tenure] decision is 
negative, the appointment for the following year becomes a terminal one”). 
 15. See Brent W. Beasley et al., Promotion Criteria for Clinician-Educators in the United 
States and Canada, 278 JAMA 723, 723 (1997) (noting that “emphasis placed on original 
research . . . has made achieving the rank of associate professor, let alone professor, difficult for 
clinician-educators.”). 
 16. See generally Jones & Gold, supra note 9. 
 17. See id. at 215-16. 
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tracks for full-time clinical faculty whose primary responsibilities are in the 
areas of patient care, teaching, and research.18  This medical research track 
typically creates anxiety within the university community as a whole, since 
faculty in the traditional science departments of the university do not see much 
difference between their appointments and those of the basic science faculty at 
the medical school.  Consequently, the university faculty can be expected to 
view creation of such a track as the prelude to an attack on tenure. 
Clinical tracks facilitate the promotion of faculty whose primary 
responsibilities are in the area of patient care and whose research represents 
only a minor portion of his or her academic contribution.  More than a third of 
schools having clinical tracks allow faculty to use unmodified titles such as  
“clinical professor,” “clinical educator,” “clinical scholar,” and “clinical 
pathway.”19  Schools that require modified titles, frequently use the titles  
“Clinical Professor” and “Professor of Clinical.”20  However, as noted by a 
1997 AAMC report, using the “clinical” prefix “blurs the distinction between 
full-time clinical track faculty and part-time or volunteer faculty” who have 
traditionally carried the “clinical” title.21 
Clinical track appointments are similar because they “de-emphasi[ze] . . . 
traditional research requirements in promotion decisions.”22  Nonetheless, 
tenure decisions are usually based upon “scholarship” that is verified, for 
example, by publications, speeches, and curriculum development.23  The 
“prime motivator” behind clinician-educator track development, however, is 
“to provide for clinical faculty appointments without the financial obligations 
associated with tenure.”24  Hence, it is not surprising that the vast majority of 
medical schools having clinical tracks do not offer tenure tracks to such 
faculty.25  Faculty in non-tenured clinical tracks typically enjoy all the 
 
 18. Id. at 216. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 215-16. 
 21. See Jones & Gold, supra note 9, at 215-16.  See generally Maureen Parris & Edward J. 
Stemmler, Development of Clinician-Educator Faculty Track at the University of Pennsylvania, 
59 J. MED. EDUC. 465 (1984) (following the evolution of the clinical faculty track). 
 22. Robert F. Jones & Susan C. Sanderson, Tenure Policies in U.S. and Canadian Medical 
Schools, 69 ACAD. MED. 772, 773 (1994). 
 23. Evidence of scholarship from the “medical school perspective” frequently includes: 
“publications of case reports, book chapters, and reviews; development of learning tools 
(software, CD-ROM, etc.); curriculum development activities; formal evaluations of teaching 
performance; speeches and presentations to professional groups; and development of model 
clinical service programs.”  Jones & Gold, supra note 9, at 216. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Brent W. Beasley et al., Promotion Criteria for Clinician-Educators in the United 
States and Canada, 278 JAMA 723 (1997) (referencing unpublished 1997 AAMC data indicating 
that the percentage of schools offering tenure tracks for clinician-educators “is very low”).  
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privileges of tenure-track faculty, except sabbatical leave and, in some cases, 
voting privileges in the faculty senate; however, the non-tenured clinical track 
employment relationship is governed by annual and multi-year employment 
agreements or letters of appointment.26 
B. Compensation 
Compensation issues become paramount as universities and medical 
schools realign to cope with diminished revenues.  The amount of tenure-
guaranteed salary and benefits becomes increasingly important, particularly if 
a school finds that it must reduce the total number of faculty employed at the 
school. 
Typically, there has been no defined university policy for financial 
guarantees of tenure.  At universities, if not at medical schools, faculty assume 
that their entire current salary is their tenured salary unless there is an explicit 
university policy or appointment letter to the contrary.  Faculty salary support 
at medical schools may be drawn not only from the Faculty Practice Plan 
revenues, but also from contracts with affiliated hospitals and research grants 
that are not guaranteed.  The trends in this area have been toward greater 
accountability and line-of-business financing: 
 Defining the financial commitment associated with tenure; 
 Linking compensation to productivity and salary source; and 
 Initiating and revising periodic evaluation of all faculty, including 
those with tenure (“Post-tenure review”).27 
In a 1983 survey of American medical schools, forty-one percent of the 
medical schools responding indicated that “tenure guaranteed no more than a 
continued appointment at a designated rank—without salary guarantee.”28  
Many of the schools reported having “no clear policy” as to the percentage of 
salary the tenure guaranteed.29  In a repeat survey in 1994, sixty-nine percent 
of the responding schools stated that tenure entails a financial guarantee, while 
seventeen percent considered tenure only as “tenure of title.”30  In the interim 
between 1993 and 1994, many medical schools undertook defining the 
financial guarantee associated with tenure.  In the 1994 survey only nine 
responding schools (four of which granted tenure only to basic science faculty) 
extended the financial guarantee of tenure to a “faculty member’s total 
 
However, the surveyors found that “schools are using and finding . . . a number of methods to 
evaluate [clinician-educators’] contributions and skills.”  Id. at 728. 
 26. Jones & Gold, supra note 9, at 216. 
 27. Id. at 217-19. 
 28. Jones & Sanderson, supra note 22, at 775. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 774.  “Tenure of title” indicates tenure guarantees without financial guarantees.  Id. 
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salary/compensation without any indicated exclusion except supplements for 
administrative duties and the bonus/incentive portions of clinical income.”31  
The majority of the schools, however, defined financial guarantee as “the 
component of salary from university/state funds,” or as an otherwise defined 
“base salary.”32  A number of schools excluded clinical income or research and 
clinical grant income from the financially guaranteed “tenure salary.”33  A 
substantial percentage of schools indicated that “the extent of the financial 
guarantee was not clearly defined.”34 
The experience of the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine (“Hopkins”) is 
illustrative.35  As late as 1995, Hopkins’ handbook of policies and guidelines 
(“The Gold Book”) guaranteed the medical faculty a full base salary by stating 
“the salary level established for any given year will serve as a salary base for 
subsequent years of a contract . . . .”36  A committee comprised of members 
from clinical and basic science departments (the “Committee”) conducted a 
financial analysis and found, in part, that Hopkins’ ongoing salary obligations 
for faculty with tenure (“contracts to retirement” or “CTR”) exceeded $509 
million.37  CTRs were designed when the mandatory retirement age was sixty-
five;38 however, subsequent elimination of mandatory retirement resulted in 
their indefinite continuation.39 
The Committee conducted an in-depth review of compensation systems at 
comparable research-intensive private university schools of medicine, 
including Columbia University, Duke University, University of Pennsylvania, 
Stanford, and Yale.  All of these schools had adopted a compensation system 
that included standard base-level salaries, a supplemental market-adjusted 
component, and a performance incentive segment.40  After reviewing 
compensation systems at four additional peer medical schools, the Committee 
concluded that Hopkins was the only medical school in the nation that still 
guaranteed a full base salary.41  As a result, Hopkins implemented a plan tying 
compensation more directly to performance.42 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Jones & Sanderson, supra note 22, at 774. 
 34. Id. at 775. 
 35. See Elaine Weiss, Rethinking Faculty Salaries, HOPKINS MED. NEWS, Spring-Summer 
1997, at 31. 
 36. Id. at 33. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 
6(b), 100 Stat. 3342 (1986) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1994)). 
 39. Weiss, supra note 35, at 33. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 31. 
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Most medical schools now employ a “Base, Supplement and Incentive” 
(“BSI”) salary formula.43  Under this formula, the base salary is the guaranteed 
or “tenured” salary upon which fringe benefits are based.44  The base salary 
typically is uniform for all faculty at a particular rank and is fixed at the 
average salary for arts and science faculty in equivalent ranks at the university, 
or at some percentile of the Association of American Medical Colleges’ 
(“AAMC”) annual published average salary for the faculty rank.45  The 
supplemental salary generally is a negotiated component reflecting the market 
value of the faculty member; is typically negotiated on an annual basis, is paid 
in equal installments over the year, and is contingent upon funds being 
available from a particular source, such as Faculty Practice Plan revenues.46 
The incentive or bonus salary is usually paid quarterly, based upon 
achievement of milestones, either individually or by the department or 
division, and is contingent upon the availability of funds.47  A number of 
medical schools, including the University of North Carolina, have 
implemented “withhold” systems that retain a percentage of the supplemental 
compensation until the end of the year and pay the full amount only if the 
department as a whole has reached its goals.48  The Hopkins’ faculty 
compensation plan currently allows individual departments to offer financial 
incentives for “exceptional accomplishments in teaching, research and/or 
 
 43. The University HealthSystem Consortium (“UHC”), comprised of academic medical 
centers associated with universities, has collected exemplary procedures, forms, and assessment 
tools from member institutions.  Among others, the volume includes the salary plan for the 
University of Colorado School of Medicine, which was fully implemented for all faculty for the 
1996-1997 fiscal year, which the author commends as a readable and workable model.  See 
University of Colorado Health Sciences Center Proposal for a Flexible Salary Structure 
(Including Implementation Guidelines), PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION RESOURCE MANUAL 
(University HealthSystem Consortium, Oak Brook, Ill.), 1998, at Tool 4-2 [hereinafter UHC 
PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION RESOURCE MANUAL, Tool 4-2].  For an in-depth introduction to 
current physician compensation strategies and economic models for financial management 
capabilities for academic health centers, see Designing and Implementing New Economic 
Systems, 1997 UHC RESEARCH PROJECT (University HealthSystem Consortium, Oak Brook, Ill.), 
1997. 
 44. See UHC PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION RESOURCE MANUAL, Tool 4-2, supra note 43, at 
3-4. 
 45. See, e.g., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, School of Medicine Clinical Faculty 
Compensation Plan, PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION RESOURCE MANUAL (University HealthSystem 
Consortium, Oak Brook, Ill.), 1998, Tool 3-26, at 3-4 [hereinafter UHC PHYSICIAN 
COMPENSATION RESOURCE MANUAL, Tool 3-26]. 
 46. See, e.g., UHC PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION RESOURCE MANUAL, Tool 4-2, supra note 
43, at 4-5; UHC PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION RESOURCE MANUAL, Tool 3-26, supra note 45, at 4-
5. 
 47. See, e.g., UHC PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION RESOURCE MANUAL, Tool 4-2, supra note 
43, at 5; UHC PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION RESOURCE MANUAL, Tool 3-26, supra note 45, at 5. 
 48. UHC PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION RESOURCE MANUAL, Tool 3-26, supra note 45, at 5. 
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patient care” as supplements to the core salary.49  By incorporating such 
flexibility into its compensation system, Hopkins seeks to protect itself in the 
event of economic downturn, and simultaneously encourage and reward 
faculty members’ hard work and accomplishment.50 
C. Annual and Post-Tenure Review 
The fundamental purpose of periodic performance review is to facilitate 
continued faculty development consistent with the academic needs and goals 
of the university and consistent with the most effective use of the institutional 
resources.51  It provides a way to recognize achievement and good 
performance of faculty and also serves to identify faculty performance 
deficiencies and provide such faculty opportunities and incentives to correct 
the deficiencies.52  It further provides a quantitative and qualitative foundation 
and documentation upon which personnel decisions—merit raises, promotions, 
assignment of administrative duties, institutional academic awards such as 
sabbaticals, even sequencing for financial-exigency-related terminations—can 
be based.53  Apart from the potential for improving performance, the 
expectation of a post-tenure review has been shown to result in faculty 
members voluntarily increasing their teaching load, or retiring.54  A systematic, 
periodic performance review schedule or a system where evaluation is 
triggered by the happening of an objective event serves to belie any allegation 
of age discrimination.55 
Experience shows, however, that annual reviews for salary increase 
purposes, particularly for tenured faculty, are often perfunctory, and that it is 
difficult for a department chair to tell individual faculty members that they are 
not doing well.56  The concept of post-tenure review varies from school to 
 
 49. See Weiss, supra note 35, at 32. 
 50. Id. at 34.  Not all of the departments at Hopkins, however, opted to include an incentive 
salary component. For instance, one department believed that such incentives could “destroy a 
sense of collegiality and team spirit.”  Id. 
 51. See John D. Copeland & John W. Murry, Jr., Getting Tossed from the Ivory Tower: The 
Legal Implications of Evaluating Faculty Performance, 61 MO. L. REV. 233 (1996), for a 
comprehensive and useful discussion of legal issues relating to faculty evaluation, including 
substantive and procedural due process and categories and criteria for evaluation. 
 52. Id. at 239. 
 53. Id. at 239-40, 244. 
 54. See Report:  Post-Tenure Review:  An AAUP Response, 84 ACADEME 61, 65 (Sept.–Oct. 
1998). 
 55. See Copeland & Murray, supra note 51, at 264-68.  Basis for terminating tenure include, 
among others, incompetence, nonperformance, insubordination, or neglect of duty. 
 56. See Denise K. Magner, More Colleges Conduct Post-Tenure Reviews, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., July 21, 1995, at A13. 
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school.57  Post-tenure review usually involves the periodic comprehensive 
evaluation, of a tenured professor’s teaching, research and service activities.58  
An AAUP report notes that a post-tenure review differs from regular salary 
increase review in the “frequency and comprehensiveness of the review, the 
degree of involvement by faculty peers, the use of self-evaluations and the 
articulation of performance objectives, the extent of constructive ‘feedback,’ 
the application of standards and principles, and the magnitude of potential 
sanctions.”59 Usually, a committee of colleagues or the department head 
conducts the review.60  At other schools, the review may be triggered by 
objective events, such as three years of below average student evaluations, low 
ratings on annual merit reviews, or failure to receive research grants.61 
The concept of post-tenure review has evoked vocal faculty resentment at a 
number of institutions.  For example, the University of Minnesota’s Board of 
Regents proposed a revised tenure code that included post-tenure review and 
other tenure policy changes that gave rise to an almost successful attempt to 
unionize the faculty.62  As a result of the faculty’s attempted unionization, a 
new “compromise” tenure code was established.  The new tenure code 
establishes a system of post-tenure review triggered by problems in a tenured 
professor’s performance.63  Subsequently, a tenured professor will be evaluated 
by a committee of peers, who will be able to suggest ways in which the 
professor can improve.  The tenured professor’s pay can be reduced, however, 
if the professor’s performance fails to improve after incorporating the 
committee’s suggestions.64 
Post-tenure review would likely be ineffective unless part of an overall 
faculty management plan that includes: specific salary and pay-raise or 
adjustment policies, a defined set of progressive administrative sanctions, a 
willingness to allocate resources to an improvement plan, and a full spectrum 
of retirement programs/options (phased or early retirement, retirement 
 
 57. See University of Texas System, Summary of Various  Post-Tenure Review Policies (last 
modified Nov. 14, 1996) <http://www.utsystem.edu/News/exhibitc.htm >. 
 58. See Magner, supra note 56.  Post-tenure review typically occurs every three to seven 
years, with some percentage of the faculty being evaluated each year.  See generally University of 
Texas System, Summary of Various Post-Tenure Review Policies, supra note 57. 
 59. Report: On Post-Tenure Review, 83 ACADEME 44 (Sept.-Oct. 1997) [hereinafter AAUP, 
Report on Post-Tenure Review) (prepared by Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, 
American Association of University Professors). 
 60. Magner, supra note 56. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Denise K. Magner, Fierce Battle over Tenure at U. of Minnesota Ends Quietly, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 20, 1997, at A14.  The faculty voted 692 to 666 against formation 
of a collective bargaining unit.  Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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planning assistance and an attractive “academic afterlife”).65  Not surprisingly, 
the AAUP is concerned that post-tenure review could erode the security of 
tenure and has adopted a report outlining post-tenure review “minimum 
standards.”66  These standards include: 
1. A process that does not intrude on an individual faculty member’s 
proper sphere of professional self-direction; 
2. Written standards and criteria developed and applied by faculty; 
3. Provision of institutional resources to assist faculty development; 
4. Opportunity for a faculty member to comment upon evaluations; 
5. Recognition that a pattern of successive negative reviews does not 
equate to cause for dismissal; and 
6. That all procedural safeguards and institutional burden of proof must 
be met before a tenured faculty member could be removed.67 
III. LEGAL ISSUES IN APPOINTMENT, EVALUATION, AND TERMINATION 
In attempting to implement the aforementioned changes in personnel 
policy, it becomes exceedingly important that medical schools and universities 
pay attention to principles of contract law, due process for state universities, 
and published practices and policies for both state and private universities. 
A. Appointment 
1. Contractual Consequences of the Letter of Offer/Appointment 
In the spirit of collegiality that marks the academic culture, search 
committee and department chairs have been known to overlook contractual 
requirements for recording specific terms and incorporating institutional 
policies in letters offering appointment to the faculty.  Since courts are likely to 
construe such letters as contractual, and, if issued by an individual with real or 
apparent authority, legally binding on the medical school or university, it is 
important that the medical school make certain that there is a clear process for 
making offers of appointment to faculty members and that this process is 
communicated to any individual in a position to make an offer of employment 
to a faculty member. 
Even when a university has a clear process for making appointments, and 
appropriately states requirements for faculty appointment in the offer letter, it 
 
 65. See generally AAUP, Report on Post-Tenure Review, supra note 59. 
 66. See id. at 50-51. 
 67. See id. 
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is possible for a chair or dean to create an issue of fact as to whether or not 
subsequent oral representations created a subsequent and enforceable contract. 
For example, in Johns Hopkins University v. Ritter68 the plaintiffs, husband 
and wife pediatric cardiologists (respectively “Dr. Ritter” and “Dr. Snider”), 
claimed that Hopkins agreed to employ them as full professors with tenure at 
the Hopkins Medical School, and breached that agreement by discharging them 
within months after they left their previous positions and began working at 
Hopkins.69  At trial, the jury awarded the plaintiffs damages in the amount of 
$822,844 after finding, among other things, that Hopkins had offered and the 
plaintiffs had accepted contracts for tenured professorships.70  The jury found, 
in part, that correspondence between the plaintiffs and the department director 
prior to the plaintiffs’ accepting their appointments constituted only part of the 
contract.71 
The correspondence at issue stated: 
You will be proposed for appointment as Professor of Pediatrics and be 
designated as the Helen Taussig Professor of Pediatric Cardiology.  Dr. Snider 
will also be proposed for appointment as Professor of Pediatrics.  
Appointments at the rank of Professor carries [sic] tenure.  As I mentioned to 
you during our phone conversation, I cannot promise you the rank of 
Professor.  That must be decided by the Professors [sic] Appointment and 
Promotions Committee and approved by the Medical Advisory Board and the 
Dean.  Your annual salary will be $150,000 plus fringe benefits, and the salary 
for Dr. Snider will be $135,000 plus fringe.  These salaries are contingent on 
your appointments as Professors.72 
In a subsequent letter, the department director confirmed that the plaintiffs 
would be “proposed” as Professors “and therefore we will not have a definitive 
decision until [the Professor’s Appointment and Promotions Committee] have 
reviewed your curricula vitae.”73  The plaintiffs received a copy of the Hopkins 
faculty policies manual (“The Gold Book”) that delineated a five-step process 
for appointment to the rank of full Professor.74  This process first required the 
department director, aided by a departmental or interdepartmental committee, 
to review the candidates’ credentials and make a recommendation to the 
Dean.75  The Dean reviewed this recommendation and forwarded his 
recommendation to the Professorial Promotions Committee that subsequently 
 
 68. 689 A.2d 91 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996). 
 69. Id. at 92. 
 70. Id. at 98. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 95 (emphasis added by the court). 
 73. Ritter, 689 A.2d at 95. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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made a recommendation to the Advisory Board of the Medical Faculty.76  The 
Advisory Board of the Medical Faculty would send any favorable 
recommendation to the Board of Trustees of the University (“Board”).77  The 
candidates would be appointed upon Board approval.78 
In October, 1993, the appointment process began and in January, 1994, the 
plaintiffs began their employment at Hopkins as Visiting Professors of 
Pediatrics, a title often used for someone awaiting formal approval as 
Professor.79  Subsequently, the appointment process proceeded.  The Dean 
forwarded favorable recommendations to the Professorial Promotions 
Committee that reviewed and recommended Dr. Snider’s appointment as a full 
professor, and a subcommittee of the Professorial Promotions Committee 
similarly recommended Dr. Ritter’s appointment.80  However, complaints 
about the plaintiffs’ inability to get along with other members of the 
department abruptly halted the process, and, in October, 1994, the department 
director notified the plaintiffs that they would not be rehired after the end of 
the year.81 
Given the text of the correspondence, the initial appointment of plaintiffs 
as “Visiting Professors,” and the specificity of the faculty handbook sent to 
plaintiffs in advance of their acceptance of the appointment, one wonders how 
Hopkins could have lost at trial.  This mystery is solved, and the answer must 
ring true to those familiar with faculty recruitment practices, in the oral 
representations made by the department director to the plaintiffs.  The 
department director, who also chaired the Professorial Promotions Committee, 
assured the plaintiffs that “the procedure [was] simply . . . a rubber-stamp and 
there would be no problem going through the process.”82 
Indeed, the plaintiffs’ testimony at trial, as well as that of other professors, 
was that the recruitment itself implies that one has the credentials to be 
recruited to the position, particularly if the individual is leaving another 
tenured appointment, and that it is the custom in academics that the title and 
appointment be negotiated before the appointment is accepted.83  Other 
evidence supporting the plaintiffs’ position was found in mortgage 
verifications given by Hopkins, which stated that the probability of continued 
employment was “[e]xcellent” and in the department director’s advice to Dr. 
Ritter that he address himself professionally as “Professor.”84 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Ritter, 689 A.2d at 95. 
 79. Id. at 94-95. 
 80. Id. at 97. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 96. 
 83. Ritter, 689 A.2d. at 96. 
 84. Id. 
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From this evidence, the appellate court held that the jury could properly 
find, as it did, that, in the recruitment process, the director had promised that 
Hopkins would employ the plaintiffs as full professors, and that the result of 
the appointment process was assured.85  Fortunately for Hopkins, the appellate 
division also held that the department director did not have the authority to 
bind the Advisory Board or the Board of Trustees to a waiver of the written 
appointment process, and accordingly reversed the jury verdict and dismissed 
the claims.86 
While there are several cases to the contrary,87 the Ritter court articulated 
the “prevailing rule:” [W]hen a tenure process is established in writing and is 
communicated to a prospective appointee, a subordinate official may not 
circumvent that process and bind the college to a tenure arrangement.”88  It is 
an open question whether or not the plaintiffs would have had a cause of action 
for misrepresentation against the department director individually, and if so, 
whether the institution might have to defend and/or indemnify the individual. 
In comparison to other medical schools where appointment letters may 
begin “I am happy to offer you an appointment as Associate Professor,” or “I 
am delighted to welcome you as a member of our department with the title of 
Associate Professor,” Hopkins conducted its recruitment and appointment with 
remarkable discipline.  The case illustrates the tension between attracting the 
individual recruited and paying homage to a process that very rarely fails to 
confirm the appointment. 
2. The Importance of Clarity and Specificity 
As medical schools implement changes, offer and appointment letters 
generally have become more specific, and department chairs and directors are 
increasingly aware of the need to incorporate precise terms into the letter, 
including: title, track, tenure eligibility or not, compensation, source of funding 
for compensation, any conditions on compensation, and continued employment 
and performance expectations.89  In the article New Bottles for Vintage Wines: 
 
 85. Id. at 99. 
 86. Id. at 100-01.  The court suggested that Hopkins “may find it necessary to amend its 
Gold Book procedures to allow for a ‘quick track rubber stamp’ procedure” to attract quality 
faculty.  Id. at 101. 
 87. See, e.g., Jones v. University of Cent. Okla., 13 F.3d 361, 365 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding 
that the plaintiff alleged facts and circumstances “that could potentially give rise to an implied 
contract” and that “[t]he district court erred in holding that an implied contract [of tenure] cannot 
exist simultaneously with a written contract [of tenure] without first referring to Oklahoma’s 
[contract law].” ). 
 88. See Ritter, 689 A.2d at 100-01. 
 89. See, e.g., The University of Southern California, Proposed Faculty Contract and 
Proposed New language for Faculty handbook (last modified Mar. 16, 1998) 
<http://www.usc.edu/dept/acsen/con.html>. 
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The Changing Management of the Medical School Faculty,90 the authors 
present examples of two appointment letters, one from 1987 and one from 
1997, to illustrate that medical schools generally have come to recognize the 
contractual nature of the letter of appointment and its role in setting 
expectations for faculty.91  While the later letter shares with the earlier letter 
language designed to attract the faculty member to the school, it also states the 
specific expectations for teaching, percentage of salary to be covered by grants, 
and other performance requirements.92  Indeed, in many cases, the appointment 
letter will be accompanied by a five-year business plan for funding the faculty 
member’s position.93  Such a plan describes, for research faculty, a decreasing 
percentage of salary to be funded by the medical school as grant funding is 
expected to increase over the period; and, for clinical faculty, the projected 
revenues and expenses expected to be associated with the clinician’s practice.94 
The precise wording of an appointment letter can be of often-unforeseen 
significance in case of a dispute.  In Keiser v. State Board of Regents of Higher 
Education,95 the Supreme Court of Montana considered the claim of a 
Montana State University (“University”) tenured professor who, after 
directorship of a home economics program was no longer open to her, returned 
to being professor in her department.96  The University offered her a reduced 
salary, contending that only the plaintiff’s professorial rank, and not her salary, 
was tenured.97  The plaintiff’s immediately prior letter of appointment stated 
that she had “continuous tenure” and did not allocate any portion of her salary 
for the directorship.98  Noting the absence of a definition of the term 
“continuous tenure” in plaintiff’s appointment letter, the court looked to the 
AAUP rationale for tenure in the 1940 Statement of Principles.99  The 1940 
Statement of Principles provides: 
 
 90. Paul F. Griner & David Blumenthal, New Bottles for Vintage Wines: The Changing 
Management of the Medical School Faculty, 73 ACAD. MED. 720 (1998). 
 91. Id. at 722. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See Association of American Medical Colleges, Fact Sheet: Faculty Appointment 
Business Plan: Joint Expectations, Joint Commitments (visited Jan. 4, 2000) 
<http://www.aamc.org/camcam/factshts/no15.htm>. 
 94. See id.; see also John A. Kastor et al., The Salary Responsibility Program For Full-time 
Faculty Members in an Academic Clinical Department, 72 ACAD. MED. 23 (1997); General 
Framework for Measuring Baseline Faculty Activity, UNC Hospitals, PHYSICIAN 
COMPENSATION RESOURCE MANUAL (University HealthSystem Consortium, Oak Brook, Ill.), 
1998, at Tool 3-12. 
 95. 630 P.2d 194 (Mont. 1981). 
 96. Id at 195-96. 
 97. Id. at 199. 
 98. Id. at 196. 
 99. Id. at 199. 
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Tenure is a means to certain ends; specifically: (1) freedom of teaching and 
research and of extramural activities, and (2) a sufficient degree of economic 
security to make the profession attractive to men and women of ability.  
Freedom and economic security, hence, tenure, are indispensable to the 
success of an institution in fulfilling its obligations to its students and to 
society.100 
Based upon the 1940 Statement of Principles, the court concluded that 
tenure included salary as well as rank.101  The court specifically noted that the 
University had drawn the appointment contract and could have specified any 
deviation from continuous tenure of the plaintiff’s full salary within the 
contract.102 
It is essential that every individual involved in the recruitment process 
understand that letters of appointment are very likely contractual, and that the 
university will not always necessarily defend the actions of a department chair 
who exceeds authority in the offer process.  The process for approval to recruit 
should be clearly articulated.103  Ideally all recruitment and offer letters should 
be reviewed by the finance and legal staff as well as by human resources staff 
prior to issuance. 
3. The “Reasonable Compensation” Component 
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that a corporation 
is exempt from taxation if it is “organized and operated exclusively for  . . . 
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, 
and no part of the net earnings of the corporation inures to the benefit of any 
private shareholder or individual.”104  Most medical schools, or their 
universities, are tax-exempt organizations; therefore, offers of employment 
must comply with federal and state requirements applicable to tax-exempt 
organizations.105 
 
 100. See 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, reprinted in AAUP 
POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 7, at 3 (emphasis added). 
 101. See Keiser, 630 P.2d at 199. 
 102. See id. 
 103. For an exemplary set of recruitment procedures see Pennsylvania State University 
Faculty Recruitment Authorization Sample Forms, PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION RESOURCE 
MANUAL (University HealthSystem Consortium, Oak Brook, Ill.), 1998, at Tool 4-4. 
 104. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994). 
 105. All institutions, whether tax-exempt or for-profit, must also consider federal and state 
laws prohibiting payments for patient referrals, see 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994 & Supp. III 
1997) (the “anti-kickback” statute), and prohibiting physician referrals of designated health care 
services to an entity with which the physician has a “financial relationship.” See 42 U.S.C. § 
1395nn (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (the “Stark Laws”).  Although beyond the scope of this article, 
these are complicated laws that contain exceptions and safe harbors for certain business 
arrangements that, although technically violating the laws, are viewed as beneficial to business 
and less likely to increase unnecessary referrals of government reimbursed health care programs.  
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The basis for an organization’s tax-exempt status is that it is organized and 
operated exclusively for exempt purposes and not for the benefit of an 
individual’s or an entity’s private interests.106  If the Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) determines that an individual or entity is benefiting financially from a 
tax-exempt organization activities, the IRS may revoke the organization’s tax-
exempt status and/or impose “intermediate sanctions” upon certain involved 
individuals who have unduly benefited from activity.107  Section 4958 of the 
Internal Revenue Code imposes a two-tiered excise tax on “excess benefit 
transactions” between 501(c)(3) organizations and “disqualified persons” with 
respect to such organizations.108  An “excess benefit transaction” is defined as: 
[A]ny transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by an applicable 
tax-exempt organization directly or indirectly to or for the use of any 
disqualified person if the value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the 
value of the consideration (including the performance of services) received for 
providing such benefit.109 
Although the intermediate sanctions are aimed primarily at compensation 
agreements, they also apply to other kinds of transactions in which a 
disqualified person receives payment based on the revenues from one or more 
of the organization’s activities (“revenue-sharing transactions”).110 
In proposed regulations, the IRS has extended the definition of a 
“disqualified person” to include, among others, any person (or family member 
of a person) who is in “in a position to exercise substantial influence over the 
affairs of the organization” including voting, managerial, or budget 
authority.111  “Facts and circumstances” indicative of those having substantial 
influence include substantial contributors to the organization or any individual 
whose compensation is based on revenues derived from activities of the 
organization that the individual controls (e.g., the director of a Faculty Practice 
Plan or departmental Faculty Practice Plans).112 
 
These safe harbors are contingent upon strict adherence to listed criterion.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 
1395nn(h)(2)(the “bona fide employment relationships” safe harbor); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(3) 
(the “personal service arrangements” safe harbor).  Thus, each case requires careful factual 
analysis and reinforces the need for specifying the expected services and corresponding 
compensation for any physician appointment. 
 106. See Gen Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Dec. 2, 1991), reprinted in BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., 
HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 561 (3d ed. 1997). 
 107. 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (1994); Failure by Certain Charitable Organizations to Meet Certain 
Qualification Requirements: Taxes on Excess Benefit Transactions, 63 Fed. Reg. 41,486, 41,488 
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 53) (proposed Aug. 4, 1998). 
 108. 26 U.S.C.  § 4958 (a)-(b). 
 109. 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (c)(1)(A).  More simply, an excess benefit transaction arises when a 
“disqualified person” receives more than reasonable fair market value for his or her services. 
 110. 63 Fed. Reg. at 41,492. 
 111. 26 U.S.C. § 4958(f)(1). 
 112. 63 Fed. Reg. 41,490. 
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The disqualified person who receives an excess benefit is subject to a two-
tiered tax on the excess benefit transaction.  The first tier tax is equal to 
twenty-five percent (25%) of the excess benefit the disqualified person 
receives.113  If the disqualified person does not pay the first-tier tax excess 
before the IRS issues a notice of deficiency for or assesses the first-tier tax, the 
disqualified person must pay the second-tier tax equal to two hundred percent 
(200%) of the excess benefit that he or she receives.114 
A separate tax is imposed on any “organization manager” involved in an 
excess benefit transaction knowingly, willfully, or without reasonable cause.115  
An organization manager is defined as “any officer, director, or trustee” or 
someone having similar authority within the organization.116  An organization 
manager involved in an excess benefit transaction must pay a tax equal to ten 
percent (10%) of the excess benefit, up to $10,000 per transaction.117  If more 
than one organization manager participates in the excess benefit transaction, 
then each such manager is jointly and severally liable for the tax owed.118 
The proposed regulations to Section 4958 presume that a compensation 
arrangement between a tax-exempt organization and a disqualified person is 
based upon fair market value if three conditions are met: 
1. [T]he compensation arrangement . . . [is] approved by the 
organization’s governing body or a [designated] committee . . . 
composed entirely of individuals who do not have a conflict of 
interest with respect to the arrangement or transaction; 
2. [T]he governing body, or committee thereof, obtained and relied 
upon appropriate data as to comparability prior to making its 
determination; and 
3. [T]he governing body or committee adequately documented the basis 
for its determination concurrently with making the determination.119 
Accordingly, the institution’s trustees or directors must conduct an appropriate 
and detailed review of all compensation agreements, aided by documentation 
that supports the market reasonableness of a proposed salary.120  In the case of 
physicians, this might include evidence of a bona fide competing salary offer, 
surveys by compensation experts, or the AAMC salary studies.121 
 
 113. 26 U.S.C. § 4958(a)(1). 
 114. 26 U.S.C. § 4958(b). 
 115. 26 U.S.C. § 4958(a)(2). 
 116. 26 U.S.C. § 4958(f)(2). 
 117. 63 Fed. Reg. 41,487. 
 118. 26 U.S.C. § 4958(a)(2), (d). 
 119. 63 Fed. Reg. 41,492. 
 120. Id. at 41,493. 
 121. See, e.g., 63 Fed. Reg. 41,504-05 (“Example 2”). 
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The financial penalties that can be imposed on those who approve 
unreasonably high compensation for individuals in a position to influence the 
affairs of the organization, as well as on the disqualified person him or herself, 
have made it imperative that there be an appropriate review of salaries offered 
to such individuals.  Additionally, a salary statement in any offer of 
appointment or reappointment should take cognizance of the compensation 
review process and incorporate appropriate qualifications into the offer of any 
particular salary.122 
4. Reserving the Right to Make Future Changes 
A university’s bylaws, governance requirements, and faculty contracts as 
interpreted from relevant documents govern the university’s right, or not, to 
make changes to faculty compensation.  Institutional documents should 
expressly allow the institution to make compensation and benefit changes.  An 
example of useful language is: 
The tenured faculty member’s compensation is subject to adjustments 
regarding salary, benefits and the conditions of employment.123 
Where the university has retained the right, through its written policies, to 
make changes to compensation and tenure policies, the courts will uphold 
reductions in compensation, even of tenured faculty members.124 
In Williams v. Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center,125 the Fifth 
Circuit upheld an annual $20,000 reduction of a tenured professor’s salary, 
finding that he had no contractual right to demand augmentation of his salary 
from a special fund.126  Further, the court found that the professor had not 
established a property right in his entire salary,127 although noting that “[a]n 
expectation of employment carries with it some protected expectations as to a 
salary . . . [which i]n some situations can encompass an employee’s entire 
salary.”128  The court held that a tenured faculty member’s contract is subject 
to tenure regulations permitting annual adjustments regarding salary, rank, and 
 
 122. There are also IRS prohibitions, articulated through court decisions and IRS Revenue 
Rulings, that define physician recruitment practices that will be deemed in violation of the private 
inurement prohibition for 501(c)(3) organizations.  See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 97-21, 1997-1 C.B. 121. 
 123. See, e.g., Williams v. Texas Tech Univ. Health Sciences Ctr., 6 F.3d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 
1993). 
 124. See generally Gerald Bodner, Does Tenure Protect the Salaries of Medical School 
Faculty?, 72 ACAD. MED. 966 (1997).  Mr. Bodner concludes that it is not clear “that tenure 
was . . . intended to protect full salaries” of medical school faculties, and “that in appropriate 
circumstances, reductions in salaries of tenured faculty are legally achievable.”  Id. at 970-71. 
 125. 6 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1194 (1994). 
 126. Id. at 293. 
 127. Id. at 294. 
 128. Id. at 293 (emphasis added). 
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conditions of employment.129  The court also observed that the university’s 
tenure regulations allowed augmentation of a faculty member’s contract to “be 
determined annually based on the recommendations of various administrators 
and approval of the president.”130 
Under principles of contract law, when one party acquires vested rights 
under a contract, the terms of the contract may only be modified through 
mutual consent and consideration.131  Accordingly, one party may not 
unilaterally deprive another of his or her contractual rights.132  Employment 
contracts that expressly incorporate university policies and regulations may 
create vested contract rights in the employee.133  In Zuelsdorf v. University of 
Alaska,134 non-tenured assistant professors claimed entitlement to an additional 
year of employment when the University of Alaska amended its policy on 
notice of nonretention, thereby giving less deference than was previously 
required under the original policy.135  The Supreme Court of Alaska held that 
plaintiffs’ rights to a continued year of employment had vested as of the 
original policy’s deadline date.136  The court noted, however, that the 
University of Alaska could amend its policies and regulations, which had not 
vested or accrued under the contract during the contract term.137 
When an employment contract does not contain specific guarantees or 
policies concerning compensation or benefits, however, a university has 
greater latitude to make institutional and individual changes.  In Gertler v. 
Goodgold,138 a New York University School of Medicine tenured faculty 
member alleged that he had been deprived of contractual rights of his tenure, 
including laboratory research space, assistance in submitting research grants, 
and fair teaching assignments.139  The court held that the university had never 
expressly obligated itself to provide the services that the faculty member 
claimed that he was entitled to receive; therefore, the university retained 
authority to make its own academic judgment and to allocate its resources 
without judicial intervention.140 
 
 129. Id. at 294. 
 130. Williams, 6 F.3d at 294. 
 131. See Zuelsdorf v. University of Alaska, 794 P.2d 932, 935 (Alaska 1990). 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. 
 134. 794 P.2d 932, 935 (Alaska 1990). 
 135. Id. at 933. 
 136. Id. at 935. 
 137. See id. 
 138. 487 N.Y.S.2d 565 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985), aff’d, 66 N.Y.2d 946 (N.Y. 1985). 
 139. Id. at 567. 
 140. Id. at 568-69. 
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B. Evaluation 
Courts have generally accorded significant deference to the decisions of 
universities and medical schools in academic matters.141  This deference 
extends in many cases to decisions with respect to evaluation and termination 
of faculty, unless there has been a violation of due process in the case of a 
public university or, in the case of a private university, a failure to accord 
process promised in the institution’s policies or in an individual’s contract.  
Additionally, adverse decisions made on the basis of race, sex, religion, 
disability status protected by federal, state, or local law may also be subject to 
judicial review. 
Tenured faculty members have a vested property right and, in the case of a 
public university, must be accorded both procedural and substantive due 
process before the vested property right may be negatively impacted.142  
Substantive due process requires that actions affecting such rights be supported 
by “just cause.”  Courts have consistently upheld the right of universities and 
medical schools to determine performance and apply standards for personnel 
decisions, as well as the right to modify and heighten their standards for 
promotion and tenure, even as to faculty members who began their 
employment under lesser standards.143 
Under general principles of good personnel management, employees are 
evaluated for job performance on a regular basis by supervisors.  Typically, 
this includes review of performance in the context of established objectives, 
the results of which are communicated in a personal meeting with the person 
being reviewed, during which objectives for the upcoming period are set; the 
results of the evaluation are recorded in a personnel file.  Traditionally, this 
model has not been embraced by the academic community for faculty 
members, although it is likely to be in effect for the rest of the university’s 
staff. 
 
 141. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (academic decisions 
require deference and are only overturned if they are “such a substantial departure from accepted 
academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually 
exercise professional judgment”).  See generally Gertler, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 565. 
 142. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972) (holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not require a university hold a hearing prior to nonrenewal of a nontenured 
teacher’s contract without proof that the teacher had a property or liberty interest in continued 
employment absent a formal contract or tenure); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-600 
(1972) (finding that a teacher was entitled to a hearing to prove that he had a legitimate claim to 
job tenure because a college had a “de facto” tenure policy arising from official rules and 
regulations). 
 143. See, e.g., Williams, 6 F.3d at 294; Lewandoski v. Vermont State Colleges, 457 A.2d 
1384 (Vt. 1996) (refusing to interfere with a college president’s “interpretations [that] were 
careful and considered . . . and not arbitrary”). 
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The trend toward accountability for medical school faculty requires that 
evaluations be carefully made and considered, since evaluation will be the 
basis not only for promotion, retention and termination determinations, but 
also for salary adjustment.144  The authors of Getting Tossed from Ivory Tower: 
The Legal Implications of Evaluating Faculty Performance145 describe in detail 
the elements of a faculty performance system designed not only to withstand 
judicial scrutiny, but also to assist in making intelligent personnel decisions.146  
Essential elements include: clearly stated evaluation purposes; written criteria 
and standards for evaluation, based upon expectations that have been 
communicated to the faculty member; training for competent evaluators; 
documentation of the basis for any decisions that are made; preparation of a 
report that contains a summary of the faculty member’s strengths, weaknesses, 
and suggestions for advancement or correction; and a meeting between the 
chair or director and the faculty member, who should receive a copy of the 
report, acknowledge it with his or her signature, and have an opportunity to 
provide a written response for his or her file in the event there is any 
disagreement with the report.147 
The bylaws or faculty handbooks of many universities and medical schools 
provide for an opportunity for faculty members to appeal or “grieve” adverse 
decisions; in such cases, the procedural steps provided in the bylaws or 
handbook must be followed.148  While individual post-tenure review 
procedures will vary, they tend generally to follow the a pattern similar to the 
University of Alabama-Birmingham’s working draft: 
1. The faculty as a group in each department or division will develop 
specific statements of faculty expectations by rank for tenured faculty 
in their units.  All tenure-track faculty are . . . [eligible] to participate 
in this process.  These . . . departmental expectations[] are reviewed 
by the relevant academic dean to ensure that departmental 
expectations remain consistent with the written guidelines in the 
 
 144. Legal issues related to implementation of compensation plans that may have the effect of 
reducing salary to tenured faculty, as well as issues specifically related to termination of tenured 
faculty, are intentionally omitted from this article, which was prepared as a companion 
presentation to Lawrence White’s Academic Tenure: Its Historical and Legal Meanings in the 
United States and Its Relationship to the Compensation of Medical School Faculty Members, 44 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 51 (2000) which includes as well an analysis of the most recent legal decisions 
in these areas. 
 145. Copeland & Murry, supra note 51. 
 146. Id. at 318-27. 
 147. Id. at 319-23. 
 148. See, e.g., Holm v. Ithaca College, 669 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (holding 
that authorized faculty handbook provisions were binding on the college and the faculty); 
McConnell v. Howard Univ., 818 F.2d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding the faculty handbook defines 
the rights and obligations of an employee and employer and must be followed). 
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[Faculty Handbook and general duties, responsibilities, and minimum 
qualifications for the faculty classification.] 
2. Faculty members file with the department office an annual 
curriculum vitae, resume, or other “academic profile” appropriate to 
their field of endeavor, including information on teaching, research, 
and service or other professional activities. 
3. Excluding probationers and those granted promotion or tenure within 
the past three years, the department chair notifies faculty to be 
reviewed each academic year and solicits from them any additional 
material they care to submit concerning their scholarly and 
instructional activities beyond what exists on file in the department 
office. 
4. The department chair then reviews the faculty member’s performance 
vis-à-vis . . . the departmental expectations.  This process is the 
responsibility of the chair alone and is not to be delegated to a 
departmental committee. 
5. When the departmental chair concludes that a faculty member has 
met the reasonable expectations . . . the chair so informs the faculty 
member and the dean, and the review is complete. 
6. Should the chair find specific deficiencies in teaching, research, or 
service, the chair is to work with the faculty members to develop a 
mutually agreeable faculty development plan to address the 
deficiencies.  If extra-departmental resources are needed to fund the 
plan, the approval, and agreement of the dean are sought.  To assist in 
the development of achievable and appropriate faculty development 
plans, the faculty member may call on the services of the 
Departmental Promotion and Tenure committee for concrete help and 
mentoring. 
7. When no agreement can be reached between the department chair and 
the faculty member on the content, funding, or timetable of the plan, 
the dean is informed and will attempt to mediate and finalize a plan 
acceptable to all three parties. 
8. Where there is no agreement about whether deficiencies exist in a 
faculty member’s professional activities, the question may be referred 
by the Dean to the appropriate school wide faculty evaluation review 
committee for a recommendation.  Should the committee find that the 
faculty member is not meeting departmental expectations, the 
individual must develop an acceptable professional development plan 
or face administrative sanctions.  On the other hand, if the committee 
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determines that the faculty member has met departmental 
expectations, then the review is deemed completed. 149 
In disputes with faculty members, universities and medical schools should 
not hesitate to provide internal hearings to aggrieved faculty members.  These 
proceedings assist in promoting a culture of disciplined decision-making; they 
afford the institution an opportunity to remedy mistakes or ill-advised 
decisions, when appropriate; and they provide valuable discovery and framing 
of issues, in cases that can be expected to be litigated. 
C. Terminations 
In the case of a non-medical school faculty member, the word 
“termination” tends to mean simply the end of employment at the institution.150  
In the case of medical school faculty, however, it is important to focus on 
exactly which relationship is to be terminated.  Under the bylaws of many 
hospitals in academic medical centers, a faculty appointment at the associated 
medical school is a prerequisite for medical staff privileges at the hospital.  
Termination of the faculty appointment then effectively results in termination 
of hospital privileges. 
Conversely, it may happen that a tenured faculty member’s hospital 
privileges are terminated by the hospital for clinical reasons; in such cases, 
unless the medical school successfully brings a proceeding to revoke tenure, 
the faculty member remains on the medical school faculty.  A worse result 
occurs in the case of medical schools that have permitted “tenure of title,” i.e., 
the faculty member has been accorded life-time tenure as “Professor of _____, 
at _____ Medical School,” and after accepting paid employment at a 
competing hospital, continues to carry the academic medical center’s medical 
school’s title to his new employment. 
1. Process 
The policies and practices of individual institutions dictate the process (in 
the case of a public institution) or the due process (in the case of a private 
institution) required in the event of termination of a faculty member having a 
vested property right.  Terminations based upon clinical performance may be 
subject to additional due process requirements and may require reporting such 
terminations to a state or federal agency.  The federal Health Care Quality 
 
 149. See University of Alabama-Post-Tenure Review Process, copy of working draft from 
1995, PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION RESOURCE MANUAL (University HealthSystem Consortium, 
Oak Brook, Ill.), 1998, at Tool 3-17. (based on a working draft for procedures at the University of 
Alabama-Birmingham, which in turn is modeled after the procedures in place at the University of 
Hawaii, one of the first medical schools to implement a post-tenure review process). 
 150. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1471 (6th  ed. 1991). 
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Improvement Act (“HCQIA”),151 for example, requires reporting of 
termination and other actions taken against physicians for reasons relating to 
competence in rendering clinical care.152  The HCQIA grants immunity to 
individuals and institutions from claims by the terminated individual, provided 
that the institution has complied with requirements of due process enunciated 
in the HCQIA and has acted in good faith.153 
The due process standard regarding termination of faculty members does 
not require courtroom style adversary proceedings.  Rather, as noted by a 
Wisconsin federal court, due process only requires that the faculty member be 
provided with: 
 [A] reasonably adequate written statement of the basis for the initial 
decision to [terminate]; 
 [A] reasonably accurate description of the manner in which the initial 
decision had been arrived at . . . [including] disclosure . . . of the 
information and data upon which the decision-makers had relied; and 
 [A meaningful] opportunity to respond.154 
As stated by the court in Texas Faculty Ass’n v. University of Texas at 
Dallas,155 “[a] procedure ensuring that (1) an instructor was not terminated for 
constitutionally impermissible reasons, (2) the administration’s actions were 
taken in good faith, and (3) objective criteria were employed and fairly applied 
in determining whom, from among the faculty at large, to terminate, is all that 
the Fourteenth Amendment requires.”156  However, a school or university must 
be careful to comply with its own policies, practices, or individual contracts 
that are more protective of, or that prescribe more specific procedures for 
faculty members.  A school or university’s failure to comply with its own 
policies and practices can provide a basis for a faculty member’s claim of 
breach of contract.157 
2. Effect on Hospital Privileges 
As previously noted, a faculty appointment at a university’s associated 
medical school usually linked to medical staff privileges at the hospital.  
 
 151. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11101-11152 (1995). 
 152. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11133. 
 153. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11111. 
 154. See Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227, 240 (W.D. Wis. 1974), aff’d, 510 
F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1975). 
 155. 946 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a public university must afford tenured 
faculty members who were terminated when their academic programs were eliminated a 
“meaningful” opportunity to be heard). 
 156. Id. at 387. 
 157. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
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Accordingly, termination of a medical school faculty member can be more 
complicated than termination of a faculty member at a non-medical institution. 
For example, in Ostrow v. State University of New York at Stony Brook,158 
a faculty member held an appointment at a medical school on a non-salaried, 
voluntary basis, at the university president’s discretion, and also held an 
appointment to the medical staff at the medical school’s associated hospital.159  
The hospital’s bylaws contained provisions for review and appeal of any non-
reappointment to the medical staff, as well as stating: “termination of faculty 
appointment shall also result in non-reappointment [to the hospital’s medical 
staff].”160  In May 1990, the university told the faculty member that it was 
terminating his appointment due to “unsatisfactory” teaching and inadequate 
fulfillment of department obligations.161  Due to the hospital’s bylaws, the 
faculty member’s hospital staff membership was also terminated; however, 
because the faculty member was not being terminated pursuant to an “adverse 
recommendation” by the hospital’s medical board, the faculty member was not 
entitled to a hearing under the hospital’s bylaws.162 
Pursuant to applicable New York law, a hospital may only terminate a 
medical staff appointment for reasons of clinical competence, qualifications, or 
other reasons related to the hospital “objectives;” any termination must state 
the reasons for the termination and accord the medical staff member 
opportunity for a hearing.163  In Ostrow, however, the faculty member initiated 
a proceeding, claiming that the hospital’s termination had been “arbitrary and 
capricious” and demanded a hearing.164  The lower court remitted the matter to 
the hospital’s medical board to conduct a hearing and review procedure in 
accordance with the hospital’s bylaws.165 
The hospital’s medical board upheld its original determination on the 
ground that termination of the faculty member’s hospital staff appointment was 
based solely upon the termination of his faculty appointment, which was not in 
dispute.166  The lower court ordered the hospital to conduct a new hearing, 
addressing the merits of the termination as argued by the faculty member.167  
On appeal, the court held that lower court’s order was improper, and further 
held that the hospital’s requiring its medical staff members to also have a 
faculty appointment was related to the hospital’s objectives: “[T]o wit, as a 
 
 158. 609 N.Y.S.2d 83 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). 
 159. Id. at 84. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801(b) (McKinney 1993). 
 164. Ostrow, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 84. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 84-85. 
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teaching institution, the Hospital sought to staff itself with faculty members 
whose academic performance was, at the very least, satisfactory.”168 
On the other hand, when a faculty member resigns from a hospital or 
where his or her hospital privileges are terminated, the faculty member’s 
faculty appointment at the medical school will not necessarily be terminated, 
unless the university or medical school had the foresight to provide (either 
contractually or in the faculty handbook) that termination or resignation of 
hospital privileges would automatically terminate or be cause for termination 
of the faculty appointment.  In the case of a tenured faculty member, the 
medical school may be left with no alternative but to bring an action to 
terminate the tenure of the individual. 
This is particularly true in the case of an unsalaried tenured faculty 
member who has tenure of title.  If the university’s procedures require that a 
university faculty committee, rather than a medical school committee, act upon 
tenure revocation, it may be difficult to convince a non-medical school faculty 
committee that loss of hospital privileges is a cause for termination of tenure.  
In such a case, the medical school may face, with no recourse, the unwelcome 
prospect of the individual who carries a tenured title using it to the advantage 
of a competing hospital. 
It is helpful to clarify which functions a faculty member provides on behalf 
of the medical school and which are provided by the faculty member in his or 
her hospital medical staff capacity.  The faculty member may have an 
administrative appointment, paid or unpaid, which it the only appointment to 
be terminated.  In Hanna v. Board of Trustees of New York University 
Hospital,169 Dr. Hanna commenced an action for a mandatory injunction to 
restore his title of Chief of the Division of Pediatric Urology and operating 
room time at the hospital.170  He claimed that his professional privileges had 
been improperly withdrawn, because the hospital failed to state the reasons for 
termination him and failed to afford him an appropriate review process.171  
New York University successfully defended the action at the appellate level on 
the grounds that the title had been given to Dr. Hanna in connection with his 
supervision of the medical school’s residency training program in pediatric 
urology, a function which he had ceased to perform, and on the grounds that 
withdrawal of a block of operating room time (which had been accorded 
 
 168. Id. at 85.  See also Schwartz v. Society of the N.Y. Hosp., 605 N.Y.S.2d. 72, 74 (N.Y. 
App. Div.  1993) (upholding the necessity of remaining on the faculty as sine qua non for 
maintaining hospital staff privileges). 
 169. 633 N.Y.S.2d 738 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995), rev’d, 663 N.Y.S.2d 180 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1997) (mem.). 
 170. Hanna, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 739. 
 171. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
108 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:81 
uniquely to Dr. Hanna by the prior urology department chairman) did not 
constitute diminishment of a professional privilege.172 
Delineation of the entity for whom services are rendered also has relevance 
in connection with various reporting responsibilities of hospitals and medical 
centers.  While termination of a faculty member for incompetence in teaching 
or irregularity in conducting grand rounds is not a reportable event under 
HCQIA, termination for incompetence in clinical care would be reportable.173 
3. Tenure Buy-Outs and Retirement Programs 
An academic medical center must confront four principal areas of legal 
concern when it elects to negotiate the involuntary termination of a tenured 
faculty appointment:174 
1. Pension law issues;175 
2. Tax issues;176 
3. Potential age discrimination issues;177 and 
4. Contract issues, in view of the fact that the involuntary termination of 
a tenured appointment is so problematic. 
Benefits, particularly pension benefits, are of primary significance.  
Because of the peculiar nature of the defined-contribution retirement plans in 
which most university faculty members are enrolled, faculty members who 
surrender compensated tenured appointments are doubly disadvantaged: their 
accumulations are reduced and their actuarial longevity following retirement is 
greater.  The result is drastically reduced annuities.  Retirement-plan 
contributions and other benefit-related concerns are often particularly 
 
 172. Hanna, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 181 (appellate decision). 
 173. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 11133(a)(1)(B) (requiring a health care entity to report if it 
“accepts the surrender of a [physician’s] clinical privileges” while the physician is “under 
investigation . . . relating to possible incompetence or improper professional conduct”). 
 174. For an excellent analysis and summary of these issues, see Randolph M. Goodman, 
Encouraging Departures Without Violating the ADEA: A Practical Discussion of Incentives to 
Leave Academic Employment Early, Address at the Annual Conference of the National 
Association of College and University Attorneys (June 16-19, 1996) (copies available for a small 
charge from the National Association of College and University Attorneys at (202) 833-8390). 
 175. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002, 1169 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).  The Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) can be found at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (1994 & Supp. III 
1997). 
 176. See, e.g., the nondiscrimination requirements of 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(a)(4) and 403(b)(12) 
(1994 & Supp. III 1997); the prohibition against accruals under 26 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1)(H) (1994); 
and the potentially adverse tax consequences associated with deferred compensation under 26 
U.S.C. § 457 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 177. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. III 
1997); Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990). 
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contentious negotiating issues.  Furthermore, the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) provides additional bases for legal action by a 
faculty member who is involuntarily terminated or whose salary is reduced.178 
The magnitude of these concerns can vary greatly among categories of 
faculty.  Clinicians with substantial incomes from independent private practice 
are in a markedly different position from tenured basic science faculty who 
often have relied upon their salaries as sole support.  Of course, some such 
faculty may have significant royalty incomes from publications or patents. 
4. Voluntary Retirement Incentive Plans 
Voluntary early retirement incentive plans do not violate the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act’s (“ADEA”) prohibition against age 
discrimination “in compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment,” provided that the plans are otherwise consistent with the 
ADEA’s purposes of “promot[ing] employment of [qualified] older persons” 
and preventing “arbitrary age discrimination in employment.”179  A recent 
amendment to the ADEA adds a “safe harbor” for institutions of higher 
education that offer age based reductions or eliminations of supplemental 
benefits to tenured faculty members who have elected to retire.180  This safe 
harbor, however, is subject to three conditions: 
i. The institution must not implement any age-based reduction or 
cessation of benefits other than these supplemental benefits; 
ii. These supplemental, age-based benefits must be in addition to any 
retirement or severance benefits that have been available to tenured 
faculty members generally, independent of any early retirement or 
exit-incentive plan, within the preceding 365 days; and 
iii. Any tenured faculty member who attains the minimum age and 
satisfies all non-age based conditions for receiving such a 
supplemental benefit has an opportunity for at least 180 days to elect 
to retire and receive the maximum supplemental benefit that could 
then be elected by a younger but otherwise similarly situated 
 
 178. See, e.g., Tavolini v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 26 F. Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d, 
1999 WL 972656 (2d Cir. 1999) (dismissing the claims of a tenured medical school faculty 
member who alleged that a salary reduction to the minimum level allowed by the faculty 
handbook for his rank constituted breach of contract, constructive discharge, and violation of 
ERISA). 
 179. 144 CONG. REC. H9081 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1998). 
 180. Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 941, 112 Stat. 1581, 
1834-35. (to be codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623(m)); 144 CONG. REC. H9081 (daily ed. 
Sept. 26, 1998). 
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employee, and must have the ability to delay retirement for at least 
180 days after making that election.181 
This safe harbor is available to plans offering benefits only to employees 
having unlimited tenure (contractually or otherwise); however, the safe harbor 
also applies to a tenured employee who is no longer tenured when benefits are 
actually provided, so long as he or she was tenured when the retirement 
incentive was offered.182 
The legislative history of the Higher Education Amendments of 1998 
provides the following examples of acceptable plans: 
i. [A] college or university plan . . . [could] offer[] to tenured faculty 
members who voluntarily retire between ages 65 and 70 a monthly 
bridge benefit, payable until age 70, equal to 50 percent of their final 
monthly salary, with the expectation that the faculty members would 
wait until age 70 to commence their regular retirement benefits.  The 
bridge benefit could be made available between other ages, such as 
60 and 65, or 62 and 69, could involve a different or varying 
percentage of pay, and could be subject to other conditions, such as a 
minimum service requirement for eligibility, or limitation of the plan 
to one or more schools, departments, or other classifications of 
tenured faculty.183 
ii. [A] plan could . . . provide lump sum retirement incentives that are 
reduced based upon age at retirement and eliminated at a specified 
upper age (e.g., 65 or 70).184 
iii. [A plan could offer] a voluntary phased, planned or similar retirement 
program for eligible tenured faculty members under which the 
retirement incentive takes the form of subsidized pay or benefits for 
part-time work or decreased duties, and the amount of the subsidy or 
duration of the part-time work or decreased duties, or both, is reduced 
or eliminated based upon age in each case, the age-based benefits 
provided would be in addition to, and not in lieu of, any retirement or 
severance benefits available within the preceding 365 days to tenured 
faculty members generally (other than benefits under a prior early 
retirement or exit-incentive plan).185 
The legislative history notes that in each example, a faculty member who 
could not receive the maximum benefit under the applicable formula due to 
age restrictions, would be given a minimum six month period to elect 
retirement and receive the maximum benefit allowed under the various 
 
 181. See id. 
 182. See 144 CONG. REC. H9082 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1998). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
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examples, and, after electing retirement, would have an additional six months 
for retirement planning.186  For example: 
[I]f the plan offered decreasing lump sum benefits to all tenured faculty 
members retiring between ages 65 and 70, inclusive, with fifteen or more years 
of service, all tenured faculty members with 15 or more years of service who 
were older than age 65 when the plan was first implemented would have a 180-
day period in which they could elect to retire and receive the highest lump sum 
benefit (the benefit that would otherwise be available only to 65-year-old 
retirees).  A similar 180-day opportunity would be offered to tenured faculty 
members who completed 15 years of service at an age higher than 65, they 
could elect the highest benefit then available to a younger (but otherwise 
similarly situated) faculty member.187 
While this new legislation must be considered by over-staffed and/or 
financially stressed institutions, early reactions to it are not overly optimistic.  
The necessity that the program be offered across-the-board and the 180-day 
window requirement window make the plans potentially very expensive and 
rob the institution of the desired selectivity as to targeted faculty.  In other 
words, some feel that the most productive and marketable faculty will take the 
package and move elsewhere while the less productive may simply choose to 
insist on their tenure rights. 
IV. FINAL COMMENTS 
After decades of steady growth for medical schools, the trustees and 
administrators of these institutions appear to be taking lessons from non-
academic mature industries, adopting programs for increased accountability, 
reengineering, line-of-business accounting, and even consolidation.  While 
many individuals regard these changes as necessary and long overdue, it is 
important to bear in mind that schools and universities are different from other 
businesses.  In contrast to other industries, the university is its faculty.  
Medical schools that have successfully adopted and implemented personnel 
policy changes, such as the University of Colorado and the University of 
Vermont, have done so through the involvement of their faculties in the 
process of change—and through the preservation of the level of benefits prior 
to the change for current faculty.188 
In academic institutions, not only is the tradition of collegiality and 
autonomy deeply rooted, but also the bylaws of many schools and institutions 
specifically provide for faculty concurrence in changes that may be proposed 
by the administration.  As managers of universities with medical schools have 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. 144 CONG. REC. H9082 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1998) 
 188. See Billy Goodman, Fiscal Constraints Threaten Tenure at Medical Schools (visited Jan. 
3, 2000) <http://www.the-scientist.library.upenn.edu/yr1998/may/goodman_p1_980511.html>. 
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re-discovered in recent years, it is not necessarily easy or possible to exercise 
all the legal authority for change that may reside in the institution’s managers. 
 
